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RIGHT OF PRIVACY PROTECTS
CONSENSUAL HETEROSEXUAL BEHAVIOR
State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976)
In State v. Pilcher,1 the Supreme Court of Iowa extended the right
of privacy to protect consensual acts of sodomy performed in private
by adults of the opposite sex.
Defendant, Pilcher, was convicted 2 of performing fellatio with an
adult person of the opposite sex, not his spouse, in violation of the Iowa
penal statute proscribing sodomy.' Pilcher appealed, challenging the
constitutionality of the statute's application to private consensual sexual
acts by adult heterosexuals.4 The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed and
held: the fundamental right of privacy protects consensual sodomitical
acts performed in private by adults of the opposite sex and, absent
a compelling state interest, may not be infringed. Accordingly, the
1. 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976).
2. The jury, by a general verdict, found the defendant guilty of sodomy without
indicating whether they found that the act was accomplished by force or with the vic-
tim's consent. Therefore, the defendant had standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the state's sodomy statute as applied to the private consensual acts of heterosexual
adults. Id. at 354, 356.
3. IowA CODE ANN. § 705.1 (West 1973) provides: "Whoever shall have carnal
copulation in any opening of the body except sexual part, with another human being,
or shall have carnal copulation with a beast, shall be deemed guilty of sodomy." Shortly
after the court's decision, the Iowa legislature enacted a new statute regulating sexual
abuse. IOvA CoDE ANN. § 901 (West Supp. 1976) provides:
Sexual abuse
Any sex act between persons is sexual abuse by either of the participants
when the act is performed with the other participant in any of the following
circumstances:
1. Such act is done by force or against the will of the other. In any case
where the consent or acquiescence of the other is procured by threats of vio-
lence toward any person, the act is done against the will of the other.
2. Such other participant is suffering from a mental defect or incapacity
which precludes giving consent, or lacks the mental capacity to know the right
and wrong of conduct in sexual matters.
3. Such other participant is a child.
4. The defendant charged that the sodomy statute was unconstitutional for the fol-
lowing reasons: 1) it was an improper exercise of the police power; 2) it violated the
due process and equal protection clauses; 3) it was void for vagueness and overbreadth;
4) it violated the right to privacy; and 5) it imposed cruel and unusual punishment. Be-
cause the court found that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on the right of
privacy, it did not reach the other grounds urged by the defendant. 242 N.W.2d at 350,
352, 359.
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Iowa sodomy statute, unsupported by such an interest, is an unconstitu-
tional invasion of the right to privacy.'
The state, acting under its broad police powers, may prohibit activi-
ties that threaten the health, safety, or general welfare of the public.'
Absent a compelling interest," however, it may not infringe consti-
tutionally protected fundamental rights." States have traditionally,
to promote public morals, prohibited various "unnatural" sex acts
5. Id. at 359.
6. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); Ex parte Weisberg, 215 Cal.
624, 627-28, 12 P.2d 446 (1932); .People v. Drolet, 30 Cal. App. 3d 207, 105 Cal. Rptr.
824 (1973). See generally Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting): "Yet the very inclusion of ... morality among state concerns indicates that
society is not limited in its objects only to the physical well-being of the community,
but has traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as well."
The state's criminal regulation of morality is premised on the view that society will dis-
integrate in the absence of a common morality. In addition, P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCE-
MENT OF MORALS 13 (1965), noted that the state's criminal regulation of morality is
premised on the view that society will disintegrate in the absence of a common morality.
Devlin's approach, however, sharply contrasts with the legislative .role envisioned by
Mill:
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forebear because it will be better for him to
do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinion of others to
do so would be wise or even right. J. MILT, ON LmEmRT 73 (Everyman ed.
1859).
Finally, Hart advocates a more moderate approach, suggesting that legislative enforce-
ment of morality is inappropriate where unessential to societal existence. Hart, Social
Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. Ca. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1967). See also
H. HART, LAw, LmnnTY AND MORALITY (1963).
7. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race classification upheld
as necessary for national security during World War I1); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S.
195 (1915) (restriction on employment of aliens upheld as necessary for welfare of un-
employed U.S. citizens). Recently, relatively minor inhibitions on fundamental interests
have survived strict scrutiny. American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
8. Interests deemed to be fundamental by the Supreme Court include the following:
the right to procreate, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); the right to vote,
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 33 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); the right to travel, Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 33 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and some
aspects of personal privacy, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See W.
BARNETr, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONsTrrooN 94-135 (1973); Goodpaster, The
Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 Aruz. L. REv. 480 (1973).
9. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971);
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated on other groundshttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/6
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including sodomy.' Although a few states have decriminalized private
consensual acts of sodomy,'0 many modem penal statutes continue to
proscribe all "deviate"" sexual acts without regard to consent, age,
marital status, sex of the participants, or place where the act occurs.' 2
The Supreme Court's recent recognition of a fundamental right to
privacy, however, challenges the constitutionality of these statutes.'3
In Griswold v. Connecticut,4 the Court identified a constitutional
right to privacy inherent in the marital relationship, the home, and the
family,' 5 and struck down a statute forbidding the use of contraceptives
by married couples.' 6 Although the Constitution does not explicitly
mention this right, Justice Douglas drew upon earlier decisions 17 and
sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107,
547 P.2d 6 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1 (1977); People v. Baldwin, 37 Cal. App.
3d 385, 112 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1974); People v. Ragsdale, 177 Cal. App. 2d 676, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 640 (1960); State v. Elliott, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976); People v.
Rhinehart, 70 Wash. 2d 649, 424 P.2d 906, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967); 4 W.
BLAcKSTONE, CoMMENTAYUEs * 215-16; 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAw 556 (2d ed. 1899). For a discussion of the common law treatment
of sodomy, see Note, The Bedroom Should Not Be Within the Province of the Law, 4
CAL. W.L.R. 115, 115-16 (1968). For a discussion of the regulation of sodomy by
religious institutions, see W. BARNrr, supra note 8, at 74-93.
10. Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, and Ohio do not criminally sanction
private acts of sodomy between consenting adults.
11. Sexual practices deemed "deviate" by sodomy statutes include fellatio, cn-
nilingus, pederasty, and bestiality.
12. E.g., Auz REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-651 (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
6605 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.230 (Vernon 1949); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. §
94-4118 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (Supp. 1973) (amending VA. CODE ANN.
§18.1-212 (1960)); Wyo. STAT. § 6-98 (1957).
13. Although the right to privacy in matters of intimate sexual relations is not impli-
cated by statutes proscribing forced sex acts, acts carried out in public, or acts with
minors, it clearly is infringed by a statute prohibiting sex acts between consenting
adults performed in private.
14. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Griswold, explained the fundamental
right involved:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than
any political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is the coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring and intimate to the degree
of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes;
a harmony of living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial
or social projects.
381 U.S. at 486.
16. Id. at 485.
17. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622 (1951); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).Washington University Open Scholarship
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concluded that the right to privacy in intimate sexual matters was a
penumbra of the Bill of Rights and emanated from the specific
guarantees of the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amend-
ments.1 8  Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Griswold pointed to an
alternative source of the right to privacy:19 the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment protected those fundamental values, includ-
ing privacy, which were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."20
Perhaps because the Court was uncertain about the origin of the right
to privacy, it failed to clearly delineate its scope. Under a narrow read-
ing of Griswold, the fundamental right to privacy extends only to inti-
mate sexual relations between married people in their own home.21 If
read more broadly, the right protects all self-directed and consensual
sex acts.22
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Warren Court expanded the
scope of fundamental interests protected by the due process and equal
18. Justice Douglas explained:
[lihe Bill -of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance .... Various guarantees
create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra
of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in
its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'
The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to
create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender
to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.'
381 U.S. at 484.
For a discussion of the right to privacy articulated in Griswold, see Dixon, The
Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64
Mic. L. REv. 197 (1965); Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The Justices and Connecti-
cut's "Uncommonly Silly Law," 42 Nom DAMn LAw. 680 (1967); Kauper, Penumbras,
Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold
Case, 64 MicH. L. REv. 235 (1965); Note, Privacy After Griswold: Constitutional or
Natural Law Right?, 60 Nw. U.L. Rav. 813 (1966); 15 CATH. U.L. REv. 126 (1966).
19. 381 U.S. at 499.
20. Id. at 500. In a concurring opinion, Justice White agreed that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment protected the right "to be free of regulation of the
intimacies of the marriage relationship. . . ." Id. at 503.
21. See the Court's language in Griswold at 485-86 ("Would we allow the police
to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contra-
ceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship.").
22. See Id. at 484-85 (The Court used sweeping language in defining a right to
privacy.).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/6
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protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment." Not surprisingly,
therefore, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird2 4 relied upon a broad reading
of the right to privacy recognized in Griswold to sustain an equal protec-
tion challenge to a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the dispensing of
contraceptives to single people. 5 After noting that the statutory classi-
fication was not even rationally related to the legitimate state purpose
of protecting public health and morals, " Justice Brennan addressed the
privacy issue. 7  Although Griswold was concerned specifically with
privacy inherent in the marital relationship, the right to privacy also pro-
tected the individual from governmental infringement of "matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as a decision whether to bear or beget
a child."2 The logical, although not necessary, 29 implication of Eisen-
stadt3 was that Griswold's broad right of privacy in marital sexual
activity also protected the individual. In Roe v. Wade, 1 the Court
further extended the right to privacy, holding that it encompassed a
23. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Lind-
sey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (although majority rejected appellant's argument that
the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful possession of one's home"
are fundamental interests, Justice Douglas in dissent readily adopted it); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 529 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term -Forward:
On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HArv. L. Rav. 7 (1969).
24. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
25. Id. at 455.
26. Id. at 452.
27. Id. at 453-54.
28. Id. at 453.
29. The Court's reasoning in Eisenstadt is subject to several interpretations. It is
argued here that the first of these is the most logical:
1) The broad privacy right of married couples in their intimate sexual relations, up-
held in Griswold, inhered in the individual and could not be interfered with absent a
compelling state interest.
2) Griswold recognized a broad privacy right in the marriage relationship and specifi-
cally a right to privacy in matters of contraceptive use and procreation. Only this
specific right was extended to individuals in Eisenstadt and could not be interfered with
absent a compelling state interest.
3) Under a middle level analysis (Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)), the statute
prohibiting the sale of contraceptives o unmarried people infringed upon an almost
fundamental interest (either the broad privacy right or the specific right to privacy in
matters of procreation). Because the classification scheme was not "substantially re-
lated" to the legitimate state purpose of protecting the health and morals of the people,
it violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
30. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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woman's decision to obtain an-abortion. 2 Absent a compelling interest,
the state could not impinge this right. 3
The Court, however, has recently contracted the scope of fundamen-
tal interests protected by the fourteenth amendment to those rights
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 4 By summarily
affirming a lower court ruling in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,8"
32. Id. at 153.
33. Id. at 154. The Court noted that during the second trimester the state could,
to promote its interest in the health of the mother, regulate the abortion procedure in
viays reasonably related to maternal health. During the last trimester the state could
regulate and even proscribe abortions, except when medically necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother, in order to promote its interest in the potentiality of human
life. Id. at 164.
34. See, e.g., Poelker v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376
(1977) (Although a woman has a fundamental right to decide whether to bear her child
or abort her pregnancy, the state may refuse to provide funds for abortions, thus effec-
tively denying this right to indigent women.); Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977); Carey
y. Population Servs. Intl., 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977) (limiting privacy right to decisions
concerning procreation and contraception); Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977)
(limiting child's right to be free from corporeal punishment in school); Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (the right to work is not a funda-
mental right); Weinberger v. Salfi, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Marshall v. United States, 414
U.S. 417 (1967).
35. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affg mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
"Summary disposition of an appeal, . .. , either by affirmance or by dismissal for
want of a substantial federal question, is a disposition on the merits." C. Wuont,
HANDBooK oF Tn LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 551 (3d ed. 1976). Accord, Mandel v.
Bradley, 97 S. CL 2238 (1977); Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959).
Summary dispositions are binding on the lower courts, Mandel v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct. 2238
(1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), although not of the same precedential
value to the Supreme Court itself as an opinion on the merits. Edelman v. Jordan; 415
(J.§. 615 (1974). "Mihe precise effect of a per curiaifi affirmance is uncertain."
Shanks, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. Rv. 256, 258 n.17 (197b). The Court's memoran-
dum iffirmances and dismissals have been "criticized as revealing insufficient deliberation
and iffording inadequate guidance as precedent." Currie, The Three-Judge Dlitrict
Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHr. L. Rav. 1, 74 n.36 (1964).
-In an era of judicial self-restraint it may be argued., however, that the summary af-
firmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attornei9 represents an approval of the lower
&ourt's reacsoning as well as its .holding.' The Supreme Court's endorsement of the Doe
court's analysis, which narrowly interpreted Eisenstadt and the fundamental right to
privacy, would be consistent with the court's recent decisions in this area. See Poelker
V.Doe, 97"S. CL 2391 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 97S. Ct. 2376 (1977); Carey v. Popula-
-ion Servs. Intl., 97 S. Ct; 2010 (1977); Paul v. Davisi 442 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976);
note 34 supra and accompanying text. The per curiam opinion in Mandel v. Bradley,
97 S. Ct. 2238 (1977), although specifically noting that "[b]ecause a summary affirm-
ance is an affirmance-of the judgment only, the'rationale of the affirmance may not be
gleaned solely from the opinion below," Id. at 4701, goes on to support the argument
outlined above by stating that "[s]ummary actions ... should not, be understood as
breaking new ground but as applying principles established by prior decisions to thehttps://op nscholarship.wustl.e u/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/6
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the Court indicated that, despite its holding in Roe v. Wade, 6 it would
endorse the narrowing of the fundamental right of privacy, rather than
follow the logical implications of Eisenstadt to hold that the personal
privacy interest protected all sexual activity between consenting
adults.37 In Doe, a three-judge federal district court upheld Virginia's
sodomy statute"8 and specifically refused to extend the right of privacy
to consensual homosexual sodomitical activity.8 9 Noting that homo-
sexual intimacy had traditionally been prohibited by the state,40 the
particular facts involved." Id. The Court's affirmance of the limited privacy right
upheld in Doe can be viewed as "breaking" no "new ground" only if the Court viewed
Griswold and Eisenstadt as establishing a limited right to privacy in decisions relating
to procreation and contraception.
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37. The court's reasoning in Doe '. Commonwealth's Attorney lends itself to two
possible interpretations-the latter of which, it is suggested here, is better. On the one
hand, the opinion could mean that the fundamental right to privacy in sexual activities
discovered in Griswold and extended in Eisenstadt protects individuals who engage in
heterosexual, but not homosexual, activity. Such reasoning, although it would make the
Pilcher and Doe holdings consistent, could be challenged on equal protection grounds.
A better interpretation of the court's reasoning is that the fundamental right of privacy
extends only to intimate sexual relations in marriage. The court in Doe did not even
mention Eisenstadt, but relied instead on Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold and
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), which ex-
plicitly limited the right to privacy in sexual activities to married couples. Because
homosexual activities were outside the scope of the privacy right, the court held that
the state could regulate them in the exercise of its police powers. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
In Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977), Justice Rehnquist, in
dissent, supports this interpretation:
I cannot, however, let pass without comment, the statement that "the Court
has not definitely answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the
Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual]
behavior among adults." Ante, at 8-9, n. 5, 14 n.16 While we have not ruled
on every conceivable regulation affecting such conduct, the facial constitutional
validity of criminal statutes prohibiting certain consensual acts has been "defi-
nitely" established. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
Id. at 2033 n.2.
38. The Virginia Code, as amended in 1960, provides in pertinent part:
§ 18.1-212. Crimes against nature.-If any person shall carnally know in
any manner any brute animal, or carnally know any male or female person
by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal
knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a felony and shall be confined in the
penitentiary not less than one year nor more than three years.
39. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
40. The court noted:
Although a questionable law is not removed from question by the lapse of
any prescriptive period, the longevity of the Virginia statute does testify to the
State's interest and its legitimacy. It is not an upstart notion; it has ancestry
going back to Judaic and Christian law. The immediate parentage may be
Washington University Open Scholarship
344 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1977:337
court concluded that the statute was rationally related to the legitimate
state interest of protecting public morals.4
In State v. Pilcher,42 the Iowa Supreme Court ignored the Doe deci-
sion,43 and held that a statute prohibiting private consensual acts of
sodomy unconstitutionally infringed the fundamental right to privacy."
The majority reasoned that because Griswold protected the sexual ac-
tivity of married couples from governmental interference, 45 the Iowa
sodomy statute, unjustified by a compelling state interest, was un-
constitutional as applied to married persons.40 Furthermore, the court
said that Eisenstadt had extended the Griswold privacy right of married
people and specifically their right to use contraceptives to include the
sexual activity of unmarried adults47 because there was no rational basis
to distinguish the right of married and unmarried people to use contra-
ceptives. Similarly, the court concluded that the Iowa sodomy statute,
which could not be applied to married people, was unconstitutional if
applied to unmarried consenting adults of the opposite sex.4 8
The Court in Pilcher adopted the view that the right to privacy pro-
tects any act that is "personal to the one performing it and [has] no
effect on others."4 9  The court noted, however, that this right did not
readily traced to the Code of Virginia of 1792. All the while the law has been
kept alive, as evidenced by periodic amendments, the last in the 1968 Acts of
the General Assembly of Virginia, c. 427.
id. at 1202-03.
41. Id. at 1203. The Doe court explained the test to be applied in reviewing legisla-
tion that implicated no fundamental interest:
With no authoritative judicial bar to proscription of homosexuality-since it
is obviously no portion of marriage, home or family life-the next question is
whether there is any ground for barring Virginia from branding it as criminal.
If a state determines that punishment therefore [sic], even when committed in
the home is appropriate in the promotion of morality and decency, it is not for
the courts to say that the State is not free to do so.
403 F. Supp. at 1202.
42. 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976).
43. Justice Reynoldson, dissenting, remonstrated the court for "ignor[ingl the action
of the United States Supreme Court, which upheld the constitutionality of a similar Vir-
ginia Sodomy Statute." Id. at 360.
44. Id. at 359.
45. Id. at 357.
46. Id. at 358.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The court adopted the broad definition of the right to privacy stated in
Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 625-26 (E.D. Va. 1973):
The phrase 'right to privacy' may, unless carefully defined, be misconstrued.
This is because privacy can refer either to seclusion or to that which is per-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/6
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protect sex acts performed in public, forced sex acts, bestiality, or adult
corruption of children."° In addition, the majority specifically reserved
the question of whether the state could prohibit acts of sodomy between
consenting homosexuals."'
The Pilcher dissent5 " recognized that under Griswold the Iowa
statute could not constitutionally regulate the private sexual activity of
consenting spouses.6'  Noting the Supreme Court's affirmance of
Doe,'54 however, the dissent maintained that the statute was constitu-
tional as applied to unmarried individuals.55 Griswold conferred a
broad right of privacy on married couples in their intimate sexual rela-
tions, specifically including matters of procreation and contraceptive use
within that right; the Pilcher dissent, however, said that Eisenstadt ex-
tended only the specific right of privacy in matters of procreation and
contraception to single people.56 Because Eisenstadt did not confer a
broad privacy right on individuals, the state could enact a sodomy stat-
ute which applied only to nonmarried people so long as it was rationally
related to the legitimate state purpose of promoting public health and
morals. The statute clearly passed this mere rationality test.57  The
dissent concluded that the majority, offended by the outdated statute,
struck it down to force the state legislature to revise it. 8
sonal. To describe an act as private may mean that it is performed behind
closed doors. It may also mean that the doing of that act is a decision per-
sonal to the one performing it and having no effects on others. In the con-
stitutional context, the meaning is doubtless closer to the latter than the former
definition.
State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d at 358.
50. Id. at 359.
51. Id. The court in Pilcher held that the fundamental right to privacy protects
individuals in their private sexual activities, and, on equal protection grounds, drew
no distinction between heterosexual and homosexual acts. Nevertheless, the court in the
future may hold that the state interest in protecting public morals is sufficiently com-
pelling to justify an infringement of the privacy rights of homosexuals. In Lovisi v.
Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), a federal district court suggested this possi-
bility: "On the facts of this case [acts of sodomy were photographed and publicized],
however, the court is not compelled to make the difficult determination of whether a
compelling state interest underlies and justifies [the sodomy statute involved here.]" Id.
at 625.
52. 242 N.W.2d at 360.
53. id. at 364.
54. Id. at 360.
55. Id. at 364.
56. Id. at 365-66.
57. Id. at 366.
58. Id. at 363.
Number 2]
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Although the Pilcher court's holding that the right of privacy protects
intimate sexual activity between consenting adults is commendable, its
reasoning, derived from a superficial reading of Eisenstadt,"0 is uncon-
vincing. First, its broad reading of Eisenstadt-that the Griswold pri-
vacy right protecting the intimate sexual activities of married couples
extends to individuals-leads to a conclusion that the right protects
homosexual as well as heterosexual activities.6 0 Such a result is incon-
sistent with the Doe holding."' In addition the court in Doe ignored
Eisenstadt and relied instead on Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion
in Griswold62 to restrict the broad privacy right to the confines of the
marriage relationship. By affirming the Doe holding, the Supreme
Court, consistent with its trend of narrowing fundamental interests, 0
seems to indicate that Eisenstadt only extended a right of privacy in
matters of procreation and contraceptive use to single people.64 Thus,
the Pitcher court's holding is undermined both by a misinterpretation
59. The dissent correctly criticizes the majority in Pilcher for its "superficial" read-
ing of Eisenstadt. Id. at 364.
60. Once the court extends the fundamental right to privacy in sexual matters to
unmarried individuals, the legislature cannot enact a statute which discriminates against
homosexuals absent a compelling state interest; the statute must withstand strict scrutiny
by the court. See note 51 supra.
61. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), afjd mem. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
62. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). Justice Goldberg and the Doe court relied heavily
on Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), which
emphasized the link between the privacy right and the marital relationship:
Indeed to attempt a line between public behavior and that which is purely con-
sensual or solitary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of
subjects with which every society in civilized times has found it necessary to
deal. The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers
may be used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and
brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual
practices which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to
lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our
social life that any constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that
basis.
Id. at 546.
Eisenstadt clearly rejected this language. That the Court affirmed an opinion re-
lying on this language supports the thesis that the Burger Court has embraced the nar-
row holding of Eisenstadt.
63. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
64. See note 29 supra. The Court in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 97 S. Ct.
2010 (1977), implicitly supports the proposition that Eisenstadt held only that an indi-
vidual is protected from unjustified governmental interference in the decision whether
"to bear or beget a child." Id. at 2018. Justice Brennan, writing a section of the
opinion in which a majority joined, went further and narrowed the broad language of
Griswold:
Read in light of its progeny [Eisenstadt; Roe v. Wade; Whalen v. Roe] thehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss2/6
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of Eisenstadt and a failure to identify and distinguish Doe from the
instant case.
Beyond its faulty reasoning, the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in
Pilcher raises a fundamental question about the role of the court in a
democratic society: Is a court the proper forum to decide whether an
individual's private consensual sexual activity is a legitimate subject for
criminal regulation? In Pilcher, the dissent thought not, and accused
the majority of overstepping its bounds by "unnecessarily engineer-
[ing] in complex moral and social areas better left to the legislature."65
Rather than follow the dissent's reasoning and affirm the statute's con-
stitutionality, 6 the Iowa court struck down a statute they believed to
be an outmoded and offensive invasion of the right to privacy. This
required the legislature to devise a more just policy.Y1 The court in
Doe, on the other hand, upheld the Virginia sodomy statute and specifi-
cally declined to judge the wisdom of the state's policy in the matter.68
The decriminalization of sodomy may be an important step in
harmonizing the law with contemporary sexual attitudes.6 9 Neverthe-
teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the state. Id. at 2018.
To be sure, Justice Brennan asserted in a footnote that the Court had not yet an-
swered the "difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits
state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults," id..,at n.5,
seeming to diminish the significance of the Doe affirmance. However, in strong con-
curring statements, Justices White and Stevens, although joining in the Brennan opinion,
indicated that states, acting under their broad police powers, could restrict or prohibit
sexual activity. In view of these statements, and those of the concurring and dissenting
justices in Carey, it appears that a majority of the Court adopted the reasoning as well
as the holding of Doe. The constitutionally protected right to privacy does not extend
to private consensual sex acts and therefore the state may regulate this activity so long
as the regulatory scheme is rationally related to a valid state purpose.
65. 242 N.W.2d at 367.
66. Id. at 363.
67. The legislature subsequently enacted a new sexual abuse statute. See note 3
supra.
68. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1975), aWfd mem. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
69. A. KINSEY, W. PoMEaoY, & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HumAN MALE
392 (1948) (95% of male population has engaged in a sexual act violative of a criminal
statute; 59% engaged in oral-genital contact; 17% of males reared on farms have ex-
perienced sexual intercourse with animals). The MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, Com-
ment 27C (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), states: "[N]o harm to the secular interests of
the community is involved in atypical sex practice in private between consenting adult
partners." See generally E. BERNE, SEX IN HUMN LOVING (1970); B. LEGMAN, ORA-
GENITALISM (1969); W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL RESPONSE (1966); D.
REUBEN, EvFRYTHING You ALWAYS WANTED To KNOW ABOUT SEX (1969); Hefner, The
Legal Enforcement of Morality, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 199 (1968); Note, Deviate Sexual
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less, when interests not clearly fundamental are infringed by stat-
utes which are rationally related to the legitimate purpose of promoting
the general welfare, the court should defer to the legislature which is
more responsive to the concerns of the general public. 71 Particularly in
the area of privacy, which has no self-evident limits, the courts should
be wary of creating policy and encroaching upon the legislative
function. 7
1
In State v. Pilcher the Iowa Supreme Court extended the right of
privacy to protect sex acts carried on in private between consenting
adults. This enabled the court to strike down a sodomy statute that
the legislature subsequently revised to conform better with contem-
porary views. Although the court's action is understandable, it is ques-
tionable whether a state court should expand the privacy right to protect
activities traditionally subject to regulation for the general welfare.
Behavior: The Desirability of Legislative Prescription, 30 ALD. L. REV. 291 (1966);
Note, The Bedroom Should Not Be Within The Province of the Law, supra note 9;
Note, Sodomy, Crime, or Sin?, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 83 (1959); Note, Extending the
Right to Sexual Privacy, 2 W. ST. L. Rav. 281 (1975).
70. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977), statements by
Justices Powell (concurring): "But a test so severe that legislation rarely can meet it
should be imposed by courts with deliberate restraint in view of the respect that properly
should be accorded by legislative judgment." Id. at 2027, and Justice Rehnquist (dis-
senting):
The majority of New York's citizens are in effect told that however deeply they
may be concerned about the problem of promiscuous sex and intercourse among
unmarried teenagers, they may not adopt this means of dealing with it. The
Court holds that New York may not use its police power to legislate in the
interests of its concept of the public morality as it pertains to minors. The
Court's denial of a power so fundamental to self-government must, in the long
run, prove to be but a temporary departure from a wise and heretofore settled
course of adjudication to the contrary.
Id. at 2034, to this effect.
71. Gunther notes that a generalized right to privacy might extend to all self-directed
acts having no effect on others. The problem, Gunther implicitly suggests, remains one
of defming "self-directed" and determining whether those acts begin to infringe others.
No guidelines can be found in a general constitutional right to privacy. G. GuTnm,
Css AND MATERUS ON CONsnTroNAL LAW 655-56 (9th ed. 1975).
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